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Two stories from the troubling side of nonprofit organizations led me
to consider the problem I now discuss.
Several years ago the Citizenship Education Fund, a nonprofit corpo-
ration headquartered in Illinois and led by Reverend Jesse Jackson, re-
ceived unwelcome attention upon the revelation that a key employee had
quietly departed with very generous severance benefits after having given
birth to Reverend Jackson's child.' The employee's salary was not listed,
as it should have been, among the five highest paid employees on the non-
profit's annual Form 990 tax returns.2 The Illinois state Attorney General
allowed the Coalition retroactively to amend its state charities report, and
then his office closed its investigation.3
On cable television, Bill O'Reilly, a vocal conservative critic of Rev-
erend Jackson, asserted that political calculations colored the Attorney
General's "go lightly" approach-particularly because the Attorney Gen-
eral was seeking the governorship at the time. O'Reilly demanded to know
why a full "audit" had not been done by the Attorney General. 4 The Attor-
ney General defended his actions, in another venue, by stating that he was
adhering to the normal practices of his office and referring interested par-
ties to the possibility of other enforcement activity by the Internal Revenue
Service. 5
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University. I would like to thank Professors Dana Brakman Reiser,
Evelyn Brody, Harvey Dale, Linda Galler, Mitchell Gans, Marion Fremont-Smith, and Mark Sidel for
their helpful comments and advice, as well as Frederick Trelfa for his valuable research assistance.
1. Tim Novak & Chuck Neubauer, Jackson Charity Adds Donors to Tax Filing, CHi. SUN-TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2001, at 12; Jerry Seper, Illinois Won't Investigate Jackson's Rainbow Group, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2001, at A3.
2. See Novak & Neubauer, supra note 1, at 12.
3. Id.
4. Mr. O'Reilly apparently confused "auditing," an ordinary function of Internal Revenue exam-
iners, with "investigation," an ordinary activity for a state Attorney General to authorize. The O'Reilly
Factor (Fox News Network television broadcast, Apr. 2, 2001) (transcript no. 040201cb.256); The
O'Reilly Factor (Fox News Network television broadcast, Mar. 28, 2001) (transcript no.
032801cb.256).
5. See Seper, supra note 1, at A3.
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The American Conservative Union, a conservative taxpayer organiza-
tion, formally requested that the IRS launch proceedings that could have
led to the revocation of the Coalition's exempt status; but the IRS declined
to pursue the matter.6 A former IRS Commissioner observed that the IRS
had fewer resources than ever before with which to monitor nonprofit
returns.
7
At about the same time, the Enron Corporation, led by Kenneth Lay,
collapsed in a scandal of legendary proportions. Allegations of wrongdoing
included fraudulent accounting reports, tax evasion, phony commodities
trading, offshore debt concealment, pension manipulation, and the misap-
propriation of funds by executives at the highest levels of the corporation.
8
As Enron's trouble became progressively more evident, its stock price de-
clined from a high near $83.00 a share in January of 2001. 9 It sputtered
downward for the rest of the year and fell through the floor, declining be-
low 67 cents in January 2002.10 The value of the assets held by the private
Kenneth and Linda Lay Family Foundation moved in a correspondingly
catastrophic fashion because the Foundation's portfolio consisted predomi-
nantly of Enron stock, which had been donated by the Lay family. 1I
In the flush times, the Lays had reduced their personal tax liability by
donating to their foundation shares of Enron, which they had obtained on
favorable terms. Personal tax returns are not public, and the matter cannot
be determined with certainty, but it is possible that Mr. Lay and his wife
Linda deducted millions of dollars in a single year to reduce their personal
tax liability. The amount of their charitable deductions could have been
valued at the appreciated fair market value ($48,186,482) of the Enron gift,
rather than at the cost to Mr. Lay of the stock he donated ($4,160,861).12
6. The O'Reilly Factor (Fox News Network television broadcast, Apr. 29, 2002) (transcript no-
042904cb.256).
7. The O'Reilly Factor (Fox News Network television broadcast, Mar. 9, 2001) (transcript no.
030902cb.256); The O'Reilly Factor (Fox News Network television broadcast, Feb. 2, 2001) (transcript
no. 020202cb.256).
8. See Wikipedia, Enron Corporation, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enron Corporation (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005).
9. Erie Berger, NYSE Blocks Further Trades of Enron Stock, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 16, 2002, at
BI.
10. Id.
11. Sandra J. Champion, Leaving a Lasting Legacy, SENIOR CONSULTANT, Apr. 2003, at 2 (stating
that 90% of the foundations $52 million portfolio consisted of Enron stock), at
http://www.srconsultant.com/ Articles/2003-04-Champion-Lasting-Legacy.pdf.
12. In 2000 Kenneth Lay's compensation exceeded $140 million and may have exceeded $168
million. See PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON GOV'T AFFS., THE ROLE OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS tN ENRON'S COLLAPSE, S. REP. No. 107-70, at 52 (2002); Steve Schifferes,
Enron's Trail of Deception, BBC NEWS, Feb. 13, 2003, at http://news.bbe.co.uk/l/hilbusiness
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As Enron stock prices collapsed, the directors of the Lay Family
Foundation-virtually all of them Lay family members and some of whom
were also employees of Enron-confronted a potential conflict between
their duties to the Family Foundation and their loyalty to Enron Corpora-
tion. 13 The foundation directors could have rationalized a delay in selling
Enron stock by equating Enron's fortunes with the fortunes of the Founda-
tion, since they held so many shares; but this must have become an increas-
ingly difficult illusion to sustain. Or, the Securities and Exchange
Commission regulations or the Lays themselves may have imposed a re-
striction on the ability to sell the stock. 14 A timely decision during 2001 by
the family dominated board to sell off the Foundation's Enron stock would
have helped conserve the market value of the Foundation's charitable as-
/2759613.stm; see also Form 990-PF returns of the Kenneth L. and Linda P. Lay Family Foundation,
2000. 2001, 2002, at www.Guidestar.com, http://www.guidestar.org/search/report/docsjsp [hereinafler
Lay Foundation Forms 990]- See generally Kim Cobb, The Fall of Enron/ Ripple Effect: Oregon Sub-
sidiary Feels Energy Giant's Bankruptcy, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 3, 2002, at A16.
13. The eight-person board of directors in 2001 included Linda Lay, president (wife of Kenneth);
Kenneth Lay, vice president; Robyn Herrold Lay Vermeil (daughter of Kenneth); Mark K. Lay (son and
an Enron contract employee); Elizabeth Ayers Lay Vermeil, as well as other Lay relatives. Only the
secretary of the Foundation, Holly Korman, appears unrelated to Kenneth and Linda Lay.
14. Rule 144 of the Securities and Exchange Commission imposes holding periods applicable to
donees or purchasers of unregistered stock from insiders, which could have affected the rate at which
the foundation could divest itself of Enron stock. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2004). Willful disregard of Rule
144 would have exposed directors to significant penalties, possibly including criminal sanctions. Tim-
ing restrictions placed by donors on the sale of donated securities are enforceable, furthermore-
although such restrictions would detrimentally effect deductibility and the enforceability of such restric-
tions has its limits. See Carol J. Sulcoski, Looking a Gift of Stock in the Mouth: Donative Transfers and
Rule 10b-5, 88 MICH- L. REV. 604 (1989). See generally Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary
Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400 (1998). Directors also should have considered section 53.4944-1(a)(2)(i) of
the Internal Revenue Service's Foundation and Similar Excise Tax Regulations, which states that:
an investment shall be considered to jeopardize the carrying out of the exempt purposes of a
private foundation if it is determined that the foundation managers, in making such invest-
ment, have failed to exercise ordinary business care and prudence, under the facts and cir-
cumstances prevailing at the time of making the investment, in providing for the long- and
short-term financial needs of the foundation to carry out its exempt purposes.
26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-1 (2004). With respect to donor-imposed restrictions, if any, directors could have
weighed their common law and statutory duties to preserve the assets of their collapsing foundation
against the costs attached to an intentional breach of restrictions-which in this case would have been
low or unquantifiable.
There are also regulations which require Foundations to diversify their portfolios, but those
sections would not, in all likelihood, have compelled action. Section 4943(c) of the United States Code
provides that a private foundation has excess business holdings in a corporation if its holdings exceed
its "permitted holdings," generally limited to twenty percent of the corporation's voting stock. 26
U.S.C. § 4943(c) (2000). The Lay family holdings, even taken together with the holdings of the other
foundation board members are not likely to have approached this level. The foundation itself only held
.5% of Enron's outstanding stock. In his personal capacity Kenneth Lay owned fluctuating amounts of
stock in Enron-but apparently not at or near the 20% level-between 1999-2002. See Tim Francis-
Wright, The Lay Fumily Charity Began at Work, at http://www.bear-
left com/original/2002/O2IOlayfamily.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2005). See generally Gary M. Brown,
Investigating Enron: Life After Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, VAND. MAG., Summer 2003, at 29.
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sets. For a Foundation officer to recommend holding onto it might have
been imprudent behavior.
But such a sell-off would not have been in the personal best interest of
the Foundation's president, Linda Lay, who was married to the Founda-
tion's vice president, Kenneth, who was Enron's president. For an Enron
officer to recommend selling Enron stock might have been a disloyal act.
Selling, furthermore, might have prompted accusations of insider trading.
Also, a sell-off might further have depressed share values and eroded con-
fidence in the company if the news of such a transaction became public. In
fact, however, the Foundation did not divest itself quickly enough to avoid
gigantic market losses.
15
The Lays received large personal tax benefits as a reward for their do-
nations to their family charity, but operating charities in Texas and else-
where, many of which received substantial long-term gift commitments
from the Foundation, were hugely distressed by the collapse of the Lay
Foundation's asset base. 16 The vast bulk of its charitable assets disappeared
before pledges could be honored and mission-oriented expenditures under-
taken. The tax benefits the Lays received exceeded, by an order of magni-
tude, what the Foundation had left to give away to operating charities. '
7
At a moment of public interest in Enron's affairs-during the critical
period in 2001 when the value in Enron stock in the Foundation's portfolio
was collapsing-neither state nor federal regulators were anywhere to be
seen. If the Texas Attorney General's office or federal regulators closely
monitored the activities of this private Foundation at that time, there is no
public evidence of the fact. Timely action by either regulator might have
15. The 2001 return of the Foundation declared a fair market asset value of $2,415,130, and the
2002 return a fair market asset value of $1,452,877. The net value of noncharitable-use assets declined
from $40,091,829 in 2000 to $26,945,796 in 2001. See Lay Foundation Forms 990, supra note 12. Prior
to 2001 the largest holding, by far, was stock in Enron. See id. The 2001 form contained an explanatory
footnote stating that the market value of the foundation's assets "declined significantly in 2001 due to
reduction in the market value of public securities owned. As of December 31, 2001, the amounts ap-
proved for future payment exceed the value of the Foundation's assets." See Lay Foundation Form 990
(2001), § XV, line 3b, at http://wwwguidestar.org/Documents/2001/760/454/2001-760454168-1-F.pdf;
see also Bill Murphy, Dwindling Lay Foundation Can 't Fulfill Year's Pledges, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 7,
2002, at A35; Francis-Wright, supra note 14 (tracing giving patterns and suggesting that it served
Enron's purposes) NYSSCPA.org, Lay Family Foundation Can't Meet Pledges (Dec. 9, 2002) (report-
ing that thc Foundation was unable to meet its pledges), at
http://www.nysscpa.org/homc/2002/1202/2week/article5.htm.
16. See Rick Cohen, Corporate Giving: De-Cloaking Stealth Philanthropy, NONPROFIT Q., Fall
2002, at http://www.plannedlegacy.com/newsletter/l1002/corporategiving.html (last visited Mar. 2,
2005).
17. See generally id.
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hastened diversification of the Foundation's equities accounts, or hastened
the sale of Enron stock, and served the public interest.' 8
Adding salt to the wound, the Foundation was permitted by state and
federal regulators to delay filing its 2001 state and federal nonprofit re-
ports. Timely public filings could have drawn public attention to the
board's decision making and provoked enforcement activity by regulators.
Instead, the Foundation received an automatic three-month extension, and
then another three-month discretionary extension; and so rather than being
filed in May of 2002, the return of the Kenneth and Linda Lay Foundation
was filed in November of 2002.19 It appears that during the critical year
when the Enron stock declined, neither the Attorney General of Texas nor
the Internal Revenue Service asked the Foundation to render an interim
accounting of its affairs.
20
Reporters who inquired about the conduct of the Kenneth and Linda
Lay Family Foundation's business at that time received little assistance
from the Foundation. Those who contacted the Texas Office of the Attor-
ney General were referred to the filing extension that had been granted by
the IRS. Did the Attorney General, or the IRS, have the authority to find
out what the Foundation was doing with its Enron shares? Neither, appar-
ently, opted to assume responsibility for carrying that particular ball.2 1
As the Jackson and Enron episodes unfolded, they revealed question-
able conduct by nonprofit officers and hesitation by regulators. Even dis-
counting for the political motivations of critics of the organizations
involved, they direct our attention to the reluctance of nonprofit regulatory
authorities to move in an aggressive and timely fashion when to do so
might be politically difficult--despite abundant grounds for concern about
damage to the public interest.
At a more provocative level than political ax-grinding, these stories
expose a pattern and practice in nonprofit law enforcement today. Principal
nonprofit enforcement agencies appear to pass responsibility for enforce-
ment from one to the other when they deem it convenient, and sometimes
the passes are never completed. They correspondingly illustrate a confusion
18. See generally supra note 14.
19. Extension requests are published together with copies of the returns. See Lay Foundation
Forms 990, supra note 12.
20. Although private foundations in Texas are not required to submit copies of their 990 returns,
Texas law permits the Attorney General to "inspect, examine, and make copies of the books, records,
and other documents the attorney general considers necessary and may investigate the association to
determine if a violation of any law of this state has occurred." TEx. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§ 252.010(b) (Vernon 2004).
21. After the debacle, neither the IRS nor the Texas Attorney General took public action with
respect to the Foundation.
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in several quarters-among the media, the public, the directors and officers
of nonprofits, practicing attorneys, and perhaps the agencies themselves-
about where the primary responsibility for enforcement of many of the
most basic nonprofit governance rules rests. The question deserves to be
asked: Does the existence of overlapping jurisdictions work to diminish the
effectiveness of the response to signs of irregularity and misconduct, or to
increase it?
For many years it was something of a clich6 among those who dis-
cussed nonprofit law to remark that its enforcement operated at two lev-
els-state and federal-where different agencies addressed distinctly
different conduct. Those who worked in the area of tax-exempt entities
could then rely on the IRS to focus on issues directly connected with taxa-
tion, while those who dealt with fiduciary duties and governance principles
could rely on Attorneys General to devote their efforts at charities regula-
tion to monitoring the mission and programmatic activities of the states.
22
Over the past thirty-five years, however, legislative and case law de-
velopments have obliterated many of these distinctions. 23 Today there is, in
substance, considerable overlapping enforcement responsibility of the prin-
cipal state and federal actors, namely the Attorneys General and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. Furthermore, Congressional proposals, which have
surfaced in recent years in connection with hearings on nonprofit oversight,
propose not merely greater "coordination" of state and federal activities,
but also suggest the extension of federal supervision into areas of fiduciary
responsibility for which the states have been principally responsible and the
expansion of state authority to take up federal claims.
24
22. It was possible, in fact, for practitioner's guides to tax matters written prior to 1969 to disre-
gard issues of nonprofit governance entirely. See, e.g., UNITED STATES MASTER TAX GUIDE § 438
(1968) (indicating five "prohibited transactions" which could destroy a contribution deduction for a
trust and might also apply to nonprofit corporations); see also James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable
Accountability, 62 MD. L. REv. 218, 265-68 (2003).
23. See NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR (2001); Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for the Bishop Estate: What Is the I.R.S.
Role in Charity Governance?, 21 U. HAW_ L. REV. 537 (1999).
24. The CARE Act of 2003, as reported to the floor of the other House of Representatives, con-
tains provisions that would amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, to authorize disclo-
sure by the Internal Revenue Service to state charity regulators of information about organizations that
have applied for, received, or been denied exemption from federal income tax or which have been the
subject of adversc action by the Internal Revenue Service. See Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping
Bad Things from Happening to Good Charities: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 108th
Cong. (2004) (statement of William Josephson), available at http://finance.sen-
ate.gov/hearings/95482.pdf; see also the discussion draft circulated by the staff of the Senate Finance
Committee (Sen. Grassley, Chair) in connection with hearings held on the subject of nonprofit supervi-
sion in June 2004, STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FIN., 108TH CONG., STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT, at




Does the greater interjurisdictional overlap produce "better" results?
There are a number of policy advantages-but there are also significant
difficulties. What follows is an attempt to explore the implications of over-
lap for the quality of an enforcement response.
1. NONPROFIT MISCONDUCT: AN OVERVIEW
Cataloging the variety of ways in which contemporary nonprofit laws
may be abused requires a book of many volumes, especially since the con-
tours of the problems with the "dark side of philanthropy" have hardly
gone unnoticed. In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, for
example, William Josephson, in charge of charities law enforcement in
New York, provided thirty-two different recent examples of abuse and
referred congresspersons to the multiyear series of investigative articles in
the Boston Globe, to make the point that abuses of the nonprofit law occur
in countless permutations. 25 The creativity of those who are determined to
enrich themselves at the expense of the public and to the detriment of char-
ity seems boundless; the negligent behavior that has led many nonprofits
into ruin is disheartening.26
On the other hand, the general types of misconduct which the laws pe-
nalize can be painted in broad strokes without too much difficulty. Building
on the work of Professor Fremont-Smith,27 and sacrificing much detail in
the process, List 128 presents a generalized compilation of improper activi-
ties which have been addressed by nonprofit law enforcement agencies. It
does not include regular offenses which affect nonprofits and for-profits
alike-therefore making no claim to be exhaustive-but it does capture, in
broad terms, the major violations and breaches.
LIST 1 Generic Nonprofit Wrongdoing
Violation/Breach of Duty
Improper or inadequate accounting or reporting practices.
Negligent supervision of operations; poor business judgment.
Unlawful political campaigning.
25. Statement of William Josephson, supra note 24; see also SILBER, supra note 23, at 3.
26. See, e.g., MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL
AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION (2004) [hereinafter GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS];
Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors of Charities: A
Survey of Press Reports 1995 2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 25 (2003).
27. GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 26, at 476 511.
28. See generally Michele Estrin Gilman, "Charitable Choice " and the Accountability Challenge:
Reconciling the Need for Regulation with the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 55 VAND. L. REV.
799 (2002); see also Peter Sword, Ethics of Charities (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Dec. 5-6, 1996),
available on Westlaw, SB30 ALI-ABA 201 (1996).
2005]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Excessive compensation or benefits
Unfair competition.
Conflicts of interest; usurpation of business opportunities.
Improper conversion from nonprofit to a for-profit business form.
Discrimination against or harassment of personnel.
Discriminatory programmatic activities.
Dissipation of nonprofit assets or investments.
Improper dissolution or termination of nonprofit entity.
Excessive or improper lobbying activities.
Violations of client, volunteer, employee, or membership rights.
Failure diligently to pursue a charitable mission.
Deviations from lawful mission.
Underpayment or nonpayment of taxes.
Unlawful invasions ofprivacy.
Deceptive charitable solicitations.
Terrorist and subversive activities and support.
The listed violations are not mutually exclusive. Failure to diligently
pursue a charitable mission, for example, may also involve negligent su-
pervision. It also happens that nonprofit groups, and those who act improp-
erly within them, seldom commit a single violation when they go wrong-
there will normally be multiple violations if there is one.
II. AN INVENTORY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
The traditional state role in licensing corporations, authorizing trusts,
and even regulating unincorporated associations sets the course for con-
temporary practices. Today's statutes typically authorize secretaries of state
to administer the formation and operational activities of nonprofits, with
additional administrative or judicial assistance. The historical assignment to
attorneys general of the responsibility for protecting assets belonging to the
public (parens patriae) typically empowers them to investigate operations
and prosecute wrongdoing on behalf of the public.29 Most attorneys general
also have the authority to stand in the shoes of injured parties and to sue on
their behalf when doing so is in the public interest.
30
State corporation laws specify the governing instruments that are re-
quired to be filed in order to operate in the nonprofit corporate form; they
29. GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 26, at 476-511. See generally Evelyn





mandate procedural regularities and proscribe director misconduct. Judicial
decisions elaborate and sometimes originate positive law to address other
kinds of nonprofit wrongdoing. Every state has statutes applicable to chari-
table trusts that define fiduciary responsibilities for trustees of charities,
and everywhere case law interprets them in its own tradition.3 1
Except for federal tax law violations, few types of nonprofit wrongdo-
ing have escaped the purview of an Attorney General's authority to investi-
gate, and, if warranted, to prosecute miscreants. Even the suppression of
subversive and terrorist activity, which is often thought of as a federal func-
tion, has state nonprofit law analogs. For example, when the Nazi Party
attempted to obtain a charter to operate its Bund as a nonprofit corporation
prior to the Second World War, a justice of the New York Supreme Court
rejected the charter as unsuitable pursuant to the state's incorporation
laws. 3
2
With the powers legislatively granted to attorneys general, there are
many sources of law to be invoked. Professor Brody enumerated some of
these sources in her testimony before the Senate Finance Committee staff
in July 2004:
Much of the common law of charity, property, and wills and trusts has
found its way into State statutes. We find State laws on nonprofit corpo-
rations; Federal and State tax laws; and State (and sometimes local) laws
on charitable solicitations. Like businesses, many nonprofits worry about
laws (sometimes with special rules for nonprofits) on contracting, labor
and employment, torts and insurance, employee benefits, antitrust, bank-
ruptcy, and political activity, as well as laws that govern specific indus-
tries such as hospitals and day care. Of additional importance are several
sources which are not themselves law but which influence legal devel-
opment, including uniform laws adopted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; model acts adopted by the
American Bar Association; and restatements and principles of the law is-
sued by the American Law Institute. 33
31. See GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 26, at chs. 4, 6.
32. See SILBER, supra note 23, at ch. 2. But see the comments of the Charities Bureau of the New
York State Department of Law in response to the March 12, 2002, Advisory of the Committee on Ways
and Means Subcommittee on Oversight:
In 1999 the New York Attorney General launched an investigation of the Holyland Foun-
dation. It was hampered by our failure to enlist the cooperation of the Internal Revenue
Service (to which the proposed amendment of Code sections 6103 and 6104 [to permit
greater sharing of information] .. . is relevant), although ultimately we were able to docu-
ment Holyland's transfer of thousands of dollars to foreign bank accounts and organiza-
tions. We have been unable to proceed further, since we lack any overseas investigative
capability, and no federal authority has come to our aid, although we have surely asked.
William Josephson, Comments on Taxpayer Rights Proposal (Mar. 26, 2003), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=306.
33. Evelyn Brody, White Paper for Roundtable on Exempt-Organization Reforms, TAX NOTES
TODAY, July 26, 2004, 2004 TNT 143 92 (Lexis), at http://services.taxanalysts.eom/taxbase/tnt3.nsf/
2005]
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Although some of the laws Professor Brody refers to above are federal
in nature, the state law matrix populates most of the legal landscape.
Chart 1 presents a general summary of actions against nonprofit mis-
conduct that are available to state attorneys general and administrators. The
actions indicated here do not have statutory or common law underpinnings
in every jurisdiction, and many of the states that do provide legal authority
for prosecution by charities regulators give them minimal enforcement
resources with which to do so. 34 For this reason, Chart 1 should not be
understood as an accurate picture of ongoing enforcement activities. "De-
spite their broad authority over charitable assets and fiduciaries," the presi-
dent of the National Association of Charities Officials has reported, "many
states lack the resources to effectively regulate the charitable organizations
operating within their jurisdictions. Of our fifty states ... most do not have
personnel dedicated to the exclusive regulation of charities."
35
And yet the erratic qualities of state regulation should not be over-
stated. The actions listed on the chart are available in most states with large
populations and active charities enforcement-including California, Illi-
nois, New York, Pennsylvania, Missouri, and a number of others. These are
areas where national nonprofit organizations-and those intending to be-
come national-need to operate. By so doing, they open themselves to
effective monitoring by multiple state jurisdictions.
CHART I State Enforcement Actions
36
Violation/Breach of Duty Attorney GenerallOther State Enforcement Action
Improper or inadequate ac- Statutory penalties for false state charities statements or for filing
counting or reporting practices. untimely or inaccurate reports; state tort law; state consumer
protection law; state tax law; whistleblower protections; violation
of nonprofit accounting principles.
Negligent supervision of opera- Violation of governance and management principles derived from
tions; poor case law, statute, and professional standards, including transgres-
business judgment. sion of prudent person and business judgment rules, duty of care
violations; breach by trustees of fiduciary standard of care; charter
and bylaw violations, etc.
Unlawful political State election campaign laws; state anticorruption statutes.
campaigning.
Excessive Breach of noninurement and nondistributional constraints estab-
compensation or benefits. lished in charters and bylaws pursuant to state law; breach of
statutes imposing reasonable compensation and reimbursement
limitations, etc.
Unfair competition. State incorporation requirements; state antitrust regulations.
Conflicts of interest; usurpation Common law duty of loyalty violations; state corporate govern-
of business opportunities. ance requirements, including disclosure statutes; common law and
34. See GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 26, at 476-511.
35. Mark Pacella, NASCO Makes Recommendations for Charitable Regulation Reforms, TAX
NOTES TODAY, June 23, 2004, 2004 TNT 121-37 (Lexis).
36. See GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 26, at 476-511.
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statutory procedural standards; state contract bid rules; common
law contractual and equitable claims; breach of bylaw and charter
obligations; contract and indemnification claims by Attorney
General based on subordination and subrogation powers, etc.
Improper Attorney General's consent authority; state nonprofit conversion
conversion from nonprofit to a laws (principally healthcare).
for-profit business form.
Discrimination against or Claims of violation of state constitutional rights; violation of state
harassment of personnel employment and human rights statutes, civil rights, or criminal
laws; whistleblower provisions.
Discriminatory programmatic State civil rights laws; public accommodation laws.
activities.
Dissipation ofnonprofit assets Common law and statutory violations of trust and corporate
or investments, investment management rules; assertion ofparens patriae power;
trustee fiduciary malfeasance; prosecution of federal jeopardizing
investment statutes under § 508(e) authority; violation of charter
and bylaw constraints; claims based on subrogation powers, etc.
Improper dissolution or termi- Attorney General's authority to judicial consent requirements;
nation of nonprofit entity. state statutory dissolution requirements; conversion laws.
Excessive or improper State and municipal lobbying restrictions; common law ultra vires
lobbying activities, actions.
Violations of client, volunteer, Private actions under state nonprofit membership rights provi-
employee, or sions; claims of state constitutional violations; common law
membership rights. contractual claims; common law and statutory employment law
violations; voting rights and membership rights, derivative ac-
tions, etc.
Failure diligently to Action, parens patriae, or on behalf of members or officers or
pursue a charitable directors, to revoke a charter; action to reclassify the status of an
mission, organization; action to revoke specific tax benefits, including
property tax benefits, for failure to qualify therefore; action to
revoke an administrative consent or state license to operate; action
to compel a name change or impose a bond pursuant to statutory
authority, etc.
Deviations from lawful Statutory and common law actions claiming ultra vires conduct
mission, and breach of duty of obedience, breach of charter and bylaw
restrictions, breach of state judicial and bureaucratic approval and
consent requirements, etc.
Underpayment or State and local tax law violations, especially state real property
nonpayment of taxes, tax exemption law; employment tax violations; municipal tax
requiremcnts; service fees, etc.
Unlawful invasions of State tort law claims; legislative consumer privacy statutes;
privacy, statutory and common law membership list protections, etc.
Deceptive charitable solicita- Violations of state charitable solicitation statutes; common law
tions misrepresentation claims; statutory consumer protection actions
based upon topical regulation of business practices, marketing
techniques, and similar statutes;
37 
deceptive acts and practices
statutes; contract, tort, and fraud law, violations of state payment
system regulations.
Terrorist and subversive activi- State antiterrorist legislation prohibiting financial support for
ties and support. terrorist activity (in some states); criminal statutes.
37. See I11. v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003). The complaint filed by the Illi-
nois Attorney General "asserted [Illinois] common-law and statutory claims for fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty." Id. at 607.
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III. THE EXPANSION OF IRS JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Next door to the more conventional tax collecting operations of the In-
ternal Revenue Service, the Exempt and Government Entities Division of
the Internal Revenue Service today supervises 1.6 million tax-exempt or-
ganizations that hold $2.4 trillion in assets.38 Many of the tasks connected
with examining the financial statements of 501(c)(3) and other organiza-
tions are also routine, but evaluating the quality of nonprofit governance
does not always sit easily within the Service. Nevertheless, the supervision
of governance has become an expanding part of its work.
For many years the regulatory actions of the Service centered on func-
tions consistent with the fisc-protecting role: determining whether applica-
tions to be excused from payment of tax through exemption should be
granted or revoked; placing nonprofit groups into their proper classifica-
tions, better to guard the government's revenue base against unnecessary or
improper deductions; detecting improper accounting practices; and impos-
ing taxes on unrelated business income. 39
The modem extension of federal authority to the areas indicated in
Chart 2, below, began late in the 1960s, particularly through new lobbying
regulations and the set of provisions contained in the Tax Reform Act of
1969, which levied excise taxes upon misgoverned private charitable foun-
dations. 40 With respect to the private foundation rules, the IRS acquired
statutory and case law approval to police board governance and to enforce
other federal statutes.41 It acquired authority to prevent loans to disqualified
persons, to prevent jeopardizing investments, excessive compensation, and
other powers.42 Within a decade, the Treasury Department had gone further
and requested that the Internal Revenue Service be able to seek remedial
decrees in equity in federal district courts to correct violations uncovered
while acting to enforce its excise tax assessment authority. Congress did
not enact these 1977 proposals, but to many professionals in nonprofit law
enforcement, the traditional division between regulating the "mission" and
38. See Internal Revenue Service, Tax Exempt & Government Entities Division at a Glance, at
http://www-irs.gov/irs/article/O,,id=100971,00.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
39. See Fishman, supra note 22, at 223, 265-67 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-
526, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT
OF CHARITIES (2002)).
40. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat 487 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
41. See Fishman, supra note 22, at 265-67.
42. See I.R.C. § 4940 etseq. (West 2004).
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regulating the "money" was breaking down and no longer appeared neces-
sary or sound.
43
In 1996, through the enactment of § 4958, public charities-which are
not covered by the private foundation rules-were subjected to IRS sanc-
tions for certain excess benefit transactions. 44 The "intermediate sanctions"
rules applied principles similar to those earlier invoked for private founda-
tions and added to the extreme and mostly impractical remedy of revoca-
tion of exemption the less catastrophic sanction of financial penalties
potentially imposed on directors, disqualified persons, and managers.
45
Chart 2 describes the current federal reach. Although private founda-
tion excise taxes were designed in part to encourage state supervision of
private foundations, the state role with respect to private foundations was
not so much enhanced as supplanted, except in the most exotic case where
a nonprofit private foundation neither had nor wanted a federal tax exemp-
tion.46 Professor Nina Crimm has noted that the enactment of the private
foundation provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 "in one sense repre-
sented a federal preemption of the [responsibility for establishing] accept-
able means of operation by private foundations."
47
CHART 2 IRS Jurisdictional Authority to Address Misconduct in Nonprofit Organizations
Violation/breach of duty IRS/federal enforcement action
Improper or inadequate Excise taxes upon excess business holdings; failure to
accounting or reporting practices. distribute income; excessive compensation; federal antiper-
jury statutes and case law; penalties for inaccurately filing
federal tax returns, etc.
Negligent supervision of Excise taxes on jeopardizing investments (pf); excess busi-
operations; poor ness holdings (pf); excess benefits transactions.
business judgment.
Unlawful political § 501(c)(3) ban on political activity.
campaigning.
Excessive § 4958 intermediate sanctions; excessive compensation
compensation or benefits, rules.
Unfair Department of Justice antitrust division enforcement; UBIT
competition, rules.
43. Brody, supra note 23, at 568-70 (citing Treasury Proposals to Improve Private Philanthropy
(Treas. Dept. News Release Jan. 18, 1977), [1977] 9 STANDARD FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6156, at
70,850-57 (Jan. 26, 1977)).
44. I.R.C. § 4958 (West 2004).
45. GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 26, at 98-100.
46. See SILBER, supra note 23, at 127-59 (regarding migration of review of many substantive
performance aspects ofnonprofits from state to federal levels).
47. Nina J. Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet on the "Home Front "for Charitable Organizations, 29
N.M. L. REV. 1,6 (1999).
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Conflicts of interest; usurpation of Excess business holdings (§ 4943 p0; self-dealing (§ 4951
business opportunities. pf); excess benefits-includes public charities (§ 4958).48
Improper Excise tax on excess benefit transactions, § 4958 pf
conversion from nonprofit to a for- (§ 501 (c)(3), (4) orgs.).
profit business form.
Discrimination against or harassment Federal nondiscrimination rules pertaining to grants; federal
of personnel. civil rights statutes as basis for revocation of exemption.
Discriminatory programmatic activi- Excise taxes rules regarding nonqualifying expenditures;
ties. constitutibnal claims.
Dissipation of nonprofit assets or Excise taxes on jeopardizing investments (§ 4944 pf.
investments.
Improper Medicare/Medicaid statutes and regulations; proposed
dissolution or termination of non- conversion rules; IRS dissolution requirements per statutes
profit entity. and regulations.
Excessive or improper § 501(c)(3) ban on substantial lobbying; § 501(h) election;
lobbying activities. § 4911; § 4912.
Violation of client, Volunteer Protection Act; federal employment law; en-
volunteer, employee, or forcement of constitutional guarantees, e.g., freedom of
membership rights, association.
Failure diligently to Revocation of exemption; minimum payout rules; excess
pursue a charitable business holdings (§ 4943 pf; § 4940 (pf tax on investment
mission- income); failure to distribute income (§ 4942 pf).
Deviations from lawful UBIT rules.
mission.
Underpayment or nonpayment of UBIT; accurate filing requirements.
taxes.
Unlawful invasions of Federal topical statutes and IRS nondisclosure rules; viola-
privacy. tion of UBIT rules regarding income from list sales.
Deceptive charitable FTC jurisdiction 4 9; nondeductible contributions (§6710);
solicitations, disclosure of nondeductibility (§ 6113).
Terrorist and subversive activities USA PATRIOT Act.
and support.
On the other hand, it was argued at passage that these excise tax and
lobbying rules were not outside the traditional role of state regulation of
charitable uses, because they fundamentally dealt with the imposition of
penalty taxes for the failure to make qualifying expenditures. Even when
intermediate sanctions were adopted, Alvin D. Lurie, an Assistant Com-
missioner of the IRS, assured readers that the state role continued to be
paramount:
[T]he ability to invoke the jurisdiction of an equity court, with its broad
and adaptable powers, is uniquely the province of the states. Only in cer-
tain limited circumstances can the Service take all of the steps necessary
fully to protect the public.... [t]he state's role... where correction re-
48. "pf" indicates that the statute is confined in reach to private foundations; "pc" means public
charity.
49. See, e.g., Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM)
Act of 2003, Pub- L No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Project No.
R411008), 69 Fed. Reg- 50091-101 (Aug. 13, 2004).
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mains outstanding, is to bring about "correction." The state alone can do
this through the exercise of state equity powers.
50
Lurie's comments understated the actual power of the IRS to bring
about corrections through the threat of revocation of exemption and mone-
tary penalties and the extent to which the Service could, if it wanted to, find
a way to pursue most of the violations of nonprofit wrongdoing that the
states could pursue. Notwithstanding the absence of federal power to obtain
equitable decrees, the Service had excise tax power and the power to re-
voke exemptions in order to conform subpar behavior to IRS standards.
In 2004, further expansions of the authority were suggested. 5 1 If some
or all of the proposals currently being debated are adopted, the legal land-
scape will advance dramatically in the direction of greater IRS and greater
federal oversight. It is a general direction supported by a number of regula-
tors and experts in the field, including Professor Fremont-Smith, who
writes that:
[e]xempt organizations are no longer the stepchildren of the Service
... [which] is staffed by specialists at the national level.., who view
their role as assuring that exempt charitable organizations continue to
make contributions to our society that are the rationale for the special
status they are afforded in the tax system.
52
IV. RECENT PROPOSALS TO EXPAND STATE AND FEDERAL NONPROFIT
AUTHORITY
Proposals to address nonprofit abuse have circulated around Washing-
ton for several years, growing out of interest principally shown in the
House by its Ways and Means Committee (Thomas, Chair) and in the Sen-
ate by the Senate Finance Committee (Grassley, Chair). During June 2004,
the staff of the Senate Finance Committee floated proposals which contem-
plate dramatic changes to existing federal statutes concerned with nonprofit
law enforcement. As related to the concerns being discussed here, the thrust
of the proposals is (a) to grant additional power to the IRS to further patrol
the conduct of nonprofit fiduciaries, (b) to vest additional power in the
States to prosecute violations of federal tax law, and (c) to relax constraints
50. Crimm, supra note 47, at 7 (citing Alvin D. Lurie, Assistant Commissioner of the IRS for
Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations, Speech Before the Third Annual Conference of the Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General Special Committee on Charitable Trusts and Solicitations (Apr.
1975), in Lurie Calls for Cooperation with States in Regulating Charitable Organizations, 43 J. TAX'N
58(1975))-
51. See infra Part IV; Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 24, at 7-
52. GOvERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 26, at xiii.
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imposed on the IRS which discourage it from sharing income tax informa-
tion with state authorities. 53
A. Proposed Expansion of Federal Authority
Senator Grassley's committee staff proposes that the self-dealing rules
which currently apply principally to private foundations should be broad-
ened to apply to public charities generally. With the exception of the pay-
ment of unreasonable compensation, the self-dealing rules that were first
adopted in 1969 would be extended to public charities (and social welfare
organizations) so that, in general, self-dealing transactions between a public
charity (or social welfare organization) and a disqualified person would
result in excise taxes.
54
The staff also proposes a five-year review of the tax-exempt status of
charitable organizations, foundations, and all other tax-exempt groups by
the IRS. 55 Every tax-exempt, essentially, would be required to file govern-
ing instruments, financial information, and narratives in order to enable the
IRS to determine whether the original determination letter should remain in
53. At least some of the proposals in the Senate Finance Committee's draft appeared to have a
chance of becoming law as this Article went to press. With support from the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, the leading coalition of nonprofits, Independent Sector, formed the "Panel on the Nonprofit Sector,"
which in turn established an elaborate set of study panels and a process "to ensure that the nonprofit
community remains a vibrant and healthy part of American society." Press Release, Panel on the Non-
profit Sector, Nonprofit Panel Proposes Actions to Strengthen Accountability of Charities, Foundations,
at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/press/interim (last visited Apr. 1, 2005). On March 1, 2005, the Panel
released an Interim Report, which embraced some of the Committee's recommendations, but declined
or postponed endorsing a conclusion with respect to others-
Among proposals endorsed in some form by the Interim Report are the incorporation of
federal standards for charitable organizations into state law; more information sharing between state and
federal enforcement officers; stricter regulation of donor-advised funds; coordination of state and
federal filing requirements; and some federal review, through new questions in federal nonprofit re-
turns, of conflicts of interest. Among those topics postponed were federally established periodic reviews
of exemption, auditing standards, and rules regarding board size and composition. See PANEL ON THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR, INTERIM REPORT PRESENTED TO THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITrEE § III (Mar. 1,
2005), at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/interim/PanelReport.pdf
54. The Senate Finance Committee discussion draft explains that:
Under present law, excise taxes apply if private foundations engage in acts of self-dealing
with disqualified persons. Self-dealing transactions generally include the sale, exchange, or
leasing of property; the lending of money or other extension of credit; the furmishing of
goods, services, or facilities; payment of unreasonable compensation by a private foundation;
transfer to or use by a disqualified person of a private foundation's income or assets; and cer-
tain payments to government officials .... In general, the definition of disqualified person for
purposes of the private foundation rules would be adopted for public charities, except that ad-
justments would be made to include persons with substantial influence over the organization,
and the rules would be modified as necessary to take into account relationships with affiliated
or supporting entities. With respect to compensation, the regulations that apply to the com-
pensation arrangements of public charities generally would be modified with respect to the
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.
Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 24, at 3-4.
55. Id. at 1.
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effect. Failure to file the five-year review would result in loss of tax-
exempt status. 56 As Professor Brody observed in a communication to the
Senate Committee, such a requirement effectively "importis] additional
substantive fiduciary law into the Internal Revenue Code.
' 57
Another proposal would see the federal government play a greater role
in the conversion of nonprofit corporations into for-profit entities. Because
of concern that conversions of tax-exempt organizations to for-profit or-
ganizations have not been sufficiently protective of charitable interests and
assets, the proposal would impose public reporting requirements on exempt
organizations in advance of a conversion, and it would apply taxes similar
to the current IRS self-dealing or excess benefit transactions excise taxes to
all parties, including successor entities. 58 This proposal, too, appears to
expand the role of the federal government, particularly the IRS, into polic-
ing the substantive fairness, the procedural regularity, and the charitable
benefit of board decisions. An additional proposal would extend Sarbanes-
Oxley accounting reforms to nonprofits. Such rules would establish federal
standards of care for the work of directors and officers, especially the work
of nonprofit financial officers and board audit committees.59
B. Proposed Expansions of State Authority
The Senate Committee staff also proposed to expand the authority of
state charities officials to bring claims based on statements in federal re-
turns as provided in existing § 508(e). The authority now enables states'
charity regulators directly to enforce several private foundation excise tax
rules, by placing a requirement that the rules be contained in state govern-
ing instruments. It was suggested that the IRS intermediate sanctions rules
(§ 4958) also ought to be made applicable to interested director transactions
as a matter of state law because, although the states already have authority
to enforce § 4941, "those cases are difficult to bring because of its slippery
standards." 60
56. Id.
57. Brody, supra note 33; see also Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from
Happening to Good Charities: Hearing Before Sen. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement
of Derek Bok) (objecting to automatic reviews as burdensome on nonprofit entities and a drain on
agency resources), at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204dbtest.pdf.
58. Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 24, at 6.
59. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; Dana Brakman Reiser,
Dismembering Civil Society. The Social Cost of Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV.
829 (2003); BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2003), at http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/sarbanesoxley.pdf.
60. Statement of William Josephson, supra note 24. Josephson testified:
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C. Proposed Facilitation of Information Sharing
For law enforcement purposes, state and federal officials have called
for greater information sharing between the IRS and state attorneys general,
the Federal Trade Commission, and the U.S. Postal Service.61
Privacy concerns underpin Internal Revenue Code § 6103 and, to
some extent, § 6104, which sharply restrict the ability of the IRS to disclose
to the states any information concerning pending applications for tax ex-
emption, investigations, or litigation. While the impact in terms of privacy
and defensive litigation might be great, proponents argue that amendment
of §§ 6103 and 6104 to allow such disclosure would alert state regulators
"to applications by organizations that have violated state law and, accord-
ingly, [through feedback from the Attorney General] could alert the IRS to
issues that might impact its decision whether or not to grant tax exempt
status," make joint investigations feasible, reducing duplicate prosecutions,
and eliminating "the possibility of inconsistent results.
'62
Chart 3 synthesizes Charts I and 2. It indicates that upon adopting the
proposals in the draft, federal power to address violations of nonprofit law
would become nearly coextensive with state law.
CHART 3 Jurisdictional Overlap (proposals for expansion in bold)
Violation/breach of duty Attorney General/ IRS/Federal en-
Available state enforcement action forcement action
Improper or inadequate Statutory penalties for false state charities Excise taxes upon
accounting or reporting statements or for filing untimely or inac- excess business hold-
practices. curate reports; state tort law; state con- ings; failure to distrib-
sumer protection law; state tax law; ute income; excessive
whistleblower protections; violation of compensation; federal










In particular cases, there would be some overlap between sections 4941 and 4958. But they
are not congruent. "Disqualified person" is much more broadly defined in section 4958(0(1).
Section 4958 separately taxes disqualified persons and organization managers .... Section
4958 covers compensation and benefits from affiliated entities. As a consequence of Code
section 508(e), the states have authority to enforce section 4941, but in fact those cases are
difficult to bring because of its slippery standards.
Id.
61. Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 24, at 16.







Violation of governance and management
principles derived from case law, statute,
and professional standards, including
transgression of prudent person and
business judgment rules; duty of care
violations; breach by trustees of fiduciary
standard of care; charter and bylaw viola-
tions. etc.
Excise taxes on jeop-
ardizing investments






Unlawful political cam- State election campaign laws; state anti- § 501 (c)(3) ban on




Excessive Breach of noninurement and nondistribu- § 4958 intermediate
compensation or benefits. tional constraints established in charters sanctions; excessive
and bylaws pursuant to state law; breach compensation rules;
of statutes imposing reasonable compensa- action on periodic
tion and reimbursement limitations, etc.; review of determina-
state authority to pursue federal inter- tion letter.
mediate sanctions.
Unfair State incorporation requirements, state Department of Justice
competition. antitrust regulations. antitrust division
enforcement; UBIT
rules.
Conflicts of interest; Common law duty of loyalty violations; Excess business
usurpation of business state corporate governance requirements, holdings (§ 4943 pf
opportunities. including disclosure statutes; common law pc); self-dealing
and statutory procedural standards; state (§ 4951 pf pe); excess
contract bid rules; common law contrac- benefits-including
tual and equitable claims; breach of bylaw public charities
and charter obligations; contract and (§ 4958); action on
indemnification claims by Attorney Gen- periodic review of
eral based on subordination and subroga- determination let-
tion powers, etc. ter.
6 3
Improper Attorney General's consent authority; Excise tax on excess
conversion from nonprofit state nonprofit conversion laws (princi- benefit transactions,
to a for-profit business pally healtheare). § 4958 pf(§ 501(c)(3),





Claims of violation of state constitutional
rights; violation of state employment and
Federal nondiscrimina-
tion rules pertaining to
63. Staff Discussion Draft, supra note 24, at 1. The Discussion Draft says:
On every fifth anniversary of the IRS's determination of the tax-exempt status of an organiza-
tion that is required to apply for such status, the organization would be required to file with
the IRS such information as would enable the IRS to determine whether the organization con-
tinues to be organized and operated exclusively for an exempt purposes (i.e. whether the
original determination letter should remain in effect). Information to be filed would include
current articles of incorporation and by-laws, conflicts of interest policies, evidence of ac-
creditation, management policies regarding best practices, a detailed narrative about the or-
ganization's practices, and financial statements. Such information would be made publicly
available. The IRS would not be required to issue a new determination letter (or to review all
organizations), but would be permitted to revoke tax-exempt status if a review undertaken by
the IRS concluded that the organization no longer was entitled to exemption. Failure to file
the five year review would result in loss of tax-exempt status.
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human rights statutes, civil rights, or
criminal laws; whistleblower provisions.
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grants; federal civil





Discriminatory program- State civil rights laws; public accommoda- Excise taxes rules






Dissipation of nonprofit Common law and statutory violations of Excise taxes on jeop-
assets or investments, trust and corporate investment manage- ardizing investments
ment rules; assertion ofparens patriae (§ 4944 pfpc); action
power; trustee fiduciary malfeasance; on periodic review of
prosecution of federal jeopardizing in- determination letter.
vestment statutes under § 508(e) authority;
violation of charter and bylaw constraints;
claims based on subrogation powers, etc.
Improper Attorney General's authority to judicial Medicare/Medicaid
dissolution or termination consent requirements; state statutory statutes and regula-
of nonprofit entity. dissolution requirements; conversion laws. tions; proposed con-
version rules; IRS
dissolution require-
ments per statutes and
regulations.
Excessive or improper State and municipal lobbying restrictions; § 501(c)(3) ban on
lobbying activities, common law ultra vires actions, substantial lobbying;
§ 501(h) election,
§ 4911; § 4912; action
on periodic review of
determination letter.
Violation of client, volun- Private actions under state nonprofit Volunteer Protection
teer, employee, or mem- membership rights provisions; claim of Act; federal employ-
bership rights. state constitutional violations; common ment law; enforcement
law contractual claims; common law and of constitutional
statutory employment law violations; guarantees, e.g.,
voting rights and membership rights; freedom of associa-
derivative actions, etc. tion; action on peri-
odic review of
determination letter,
Failure diligently to pursue Action,parenspatriae, or on behalf of Revocation of exemp-
a charitable members or officers or directors, to revoke tion; minimum payout
mission, a charter; action to reclassify the status of rules; excess business
an organization; action to revoke specific holdings (§ 4943pf
tax benefits, including property tax bene- pc); § 4940 (pftax on
fits, for failure to qualify therefore; action investment income);
to revoke an administrative consent or failure to distribute
state license to operate; to compel a name income (§ 4942 pf pc);
change or impose a bond pursuant to action on periodic




Statutory and common law actions claim-
ing ultra vires conduct and breach of duty
of obedience; breach of charter and bylaw




restrictions; breach of state judicial and
bureaucratic approval and consent re-
quirements, etc.
Underpayment or non- State and local tax law violations, espe- UBIT; accurate filing
payment of taxes. cially state real property tax exemption requirements.
law; employment tax violations; municipal
tax requirements, service fees, etc.
Unlawful invasions of State tort law claims; legislative consumer Federal topical statutes
privacy, privacy statutes; statutory and common and IRS nondisclosure
law membership list protections, etc. rules; violation of
UBIT rules regarding




Deceptive charitable Violations of state charitable solicitation FTC jurisdiction;
solicitations, statutes; common law misrepresentation nondeductible contri-
claims; statutory consumer protection butions (§ 6710);
actions based upon topical regulation of disclosure of nonde-
business practices, marketing techniques, ductibility (§ 6113);
and similar statutes; deceptive acts and action on periodic
practices statutes; contract, tort, and fraud review of determina-




State antiterrorist legislation prohibiting
financial support for terrorist activity (in





V. WEIGHING CONSEQUENCES OF OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION
The proposals that have been made recently have less to say, maybe
than they should, about the problems associated with fostering a legal re-
gime in which almost all the misconduct committed by nonprofit organiza-
tions-and most persons connected with them-can be characterized as
violative of legal rules that constitute the core responsibilities of two differ-
ent agencies at the two different levels of "sovereignty." The inability to
diagnose improper action by nonprofits is not where the majority of prob-
lems connected with overlap arise; rather, problems arise because of the
mechanisms of enforcement. Within both agencies, furthermore, enforce-
ment activity is only a small part of a larger set of responsibilities. Both
operate with different institutional incentives for taking legal action or for
refraining from enforcement activity, and each is led by political appointees
and by delegates who sometimes have ambitions of their own.
There is some theoretical support for my suggestion that, in the non-
profit sector, inadequate attention to poor performance results from coex-
tensive supervision and enforcement responsibility. Building on the well-
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developed literature about the "tragedy of the commons"; 64 on some of the
"new institutional" scholarship; 65 and on an emerging concept of a "regula-
tory commons," which exists when multiple regulators have coextensive
power to address substantially similar ills, 66 the environmental law scholar
William Buzbee theorizes that "the more complex, multilayered, or frag-
mented the legal and political setting, the more likely it is that [negative]
dynamics [leading to unsatisfactory regulation] will arise."' 67 In such a set-
ting, status quo preservation incentives are a predictable outgrowth of plac-
ing important monitoring and enforcement responsibilities into a regulatory
commons. 68 In a regulatory commons, there arise "predictable incentives
for legislators and regulators to fail to address even broadly perceived so-
cial ills." '69
Such incentives are not wanting in the context of nonprofit supervi-
sion and enforcement. The IRS is led by a Commissioner who is a political
appointee70 and who is part of an administration that, like most recent ad-
ministrations, is ambivalent and sometimes internally divided about vigor-
ous enforcement. The IRS is concerned about shedding a reputation for
unfriendliness to its customers, but it is aware that cracking down on non-
profit abuse not only promotes social welfare, it is part of the IRS's mission
and can be "good press."
State attorneys general are elected in many states.71 They, too, have
found that devoting resources to an investigation of nonprofit corporations
builds public appreciation for their work, but at other times they have found
that it has an opposite effect.
I am not deeply concerned about whether the state level of nonprofit
regulation will atrophy as a result of federal expansion-in part because of
what Professor Herbert Wechsler referred to long ago as the "political safe-
64. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
65. See Robert H. Bates, Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism,
16 J. POL. & SOC'Y 387, 394 (1988).
66. See David A. Dana, Overcoming the Political Tragedy of the Commons: Lessons Learned
from the Reauthorization of the Magnuson Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 833 (1997) (exploring how the
"government apparatus" itself can be captured by powerful interests and thereby frustrate derivation of
a cure for commons overuse).
67. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89
IOWA L. REV. 1, 22 (2003).
68. Id. at 33-36.
69. Id. at i.
70. The Commissioner of the IRS is appointed to a five-year term and reports to the Secretary of
the Treasury; "his sole mission is the administration of the tax collection system." WILLIAM H.
WEBSTER, REVIEW OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE'S CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION (I.R.S.,
Pub. No. 3388 (Apr. 1999)), available at http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=120418,00.html.
71. E.g., Florida, Tennessee, Wyoming, and many more.
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guards of federalism. ' 72 States, he asserted in that classic article, were po-
litically protected from the encroachment of federal legislation that would
diminish their power, because of the way in which the Constitution gave
states the central role in national politics. Half a century later, Professor
Larry Kramer has drawn attention to the weakness of several of Wechsler's
claims, but has revived the safeguards argument with the claim that politi-
cal linkages between state and federal actors preserve core federalist prin-
ciples. He also reminds us that if centralized authority is unavoidable in
cases such as this, it is probably because it is desirable. He points to James
Madison's observation in The Federalist No. 46:
If therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future
become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the
change can only result, from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a
better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities.
And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving
most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due.
73
It is of course much too early to tell, but the proposals which have been
advanced in Congress appear to support Professor Kramer's perspective-
they seem to widen state authority even as they would probably diminish
its relative importance.
Even if none of the current proposals are adopted, however, the prob-
lems connected with the existing amount of overlap do concern me and I
think are worth addressing. Up to this point, I have only suggested their
significance by providing the concrete examples at the start of this explora-
tion and by indicating the extent of the overlap through the charts above.
There are claims to be made in favor of undifferentiated general re-
sponsibility by multiple agencies for the enforcement of the law. A practi-
tioner in the area told me that he finds it quite effective to counsel a client
using words something like these: "Your board is proposing to pay your
chief executive too much. You know it's too high and I know it's too high,
and the Attorney General will know it's too high, and the IRS will, too.
You'll be violating state laws under which you have a duty of care, and
you'll be violating federal laws under which you may wind up personally
responsible for paying an excise tax. SO DON'T DO IT."
72. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L_ REV. 543 (1954); Larry D.
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215
(2000).
73. Kramer, supra note 72, at 286 (quoting T14E FEDERALIST No. 46, at 315, 318 (James Madison)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961))
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State and federal officials, as indicated above, tend to think that there
is little to be lost by overlapping authority. Many believe that the overlap
increases the probability of prosecution by one or the other agency and that
the ability to "pass the ball" serves a valuable function-allowing the offi-
cial to avoid matters that are problematic. Of course, if they both want to
pass the ball rather than receive it, the ball may be dropped.
Until now, there has been a public charity/private foundation division
of labor, established implicitly by the statutes, which ameliorates the over-
lap problem at the present time. The Texas Attorney General in the Enron
example above could observe, with solid support, that state attorneys gen-
eral do not generally take the lead role in supervising private foundations
despite having a statutory basis for acting to investigate them "in appropri-
ate cases."'74 The Service could observe in the Citizen's Education Fund
case that the Service does not take a lead in evaluating the substantive per-
formance of operating nonprofit organizations, even if it might have a
statutory basis for investigation.
75
There are, furthermore, working relationships which have sometimes
operated to establish priorities for enforcement. 76 State and federal authori-
ties devote their resources in a consistent manner to some enforcement
activities rather than others, depending on current events and political phi-
losophies. 77 Such consistency reduces concerns about double jeopardy,
over-prosecution, and the like. Regardless of the pressure state authorities
may feel to go after a nonprofit for its failure to pay state tax on unrelated
business income, such cases will virtually always be an IRS priority. Con-
versely, no matter how forcefully the Service is urged to take up a conflict
over the interpretation of a bylaw (unless, perhaps, the bylaw involved
discrimination subject to federal civil rights laws or depended for its inter-
pretation on the language of a federal tax provision), state action would
probably occur first.
It can be anticipated that adoption of the new rules will only serve to
exacerbate overlap concerns and raise issues of practice and law. Under the
new proposals, the amount of overlap would be much more substantial than
ever before, 78 and problems that are attributable largely to the administra-
tive discretion that exists in the present system would be greater than at
74. See supra Introduction.
75. See generally supra Part 1I and accompanying charts (examining the traditional role of state
attorneys general); see also GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 26.
76. See generally supra Part III and accompanying charts (detailing the tradition role of the IRS
and the statutory underpinnings); see also GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 26.
77. Seesupra Part 11 & I11.
78. See supra Part IV.
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present.79 The questions that are attributable to overlap today would seem-
ingly be multiplied: if an IRS proceeding to assess an excise tax against
self-dealing is brought against a disqualified person, does a prior state pro-
ceeding resolving the identical substantive question have a binding effect?
In most cases this would not appear to be the case. 80 In the interests of fair-
ness, it makes sense to bind the Service to the determinations made in prior
state court proceedings, whether adverse or favorable to the Service, when
the Service has intervened or declined the opportunity to intervene. 81
Would a state court action involving a breach of duty preclude an IRS ac-
tion contesting the same question in the form of an excise tax assessment,
particularly if the state had declined to exercise ancillary federal authority?
More sharing of information between state and federal charities officials
may lead to some actions being consolidated. In the absence of consolida-
tion, federal rules allow for the abatement of excise taxes to reduce the
amount of a federally imposed penalty if a judgment has been paid in a
prior action; 82 but these provisions contemplate, rather than work to dimin-
ish, the likelihood of dual proceedings over breaches of fiduciary duty.
To what extent would the Service defer to the states in actions involv-
ing fiduciary duties? Professor Brody has taken the view that "[i]n any case
when both Federal and State investigations are proceeding, principles of
79. Id. These problems include discretion as to whether state or federal actors, in no particular
order, choose whether to investigate or prosecute, choose whether to share information among them-
selves, and sometimes choose to do nothing at all.
80. See Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967) (state court decisions do not bind the
IRS to decisions to which the IRS is not a party). But see United States v. White, 853 F.2d 107 (1988)
(IRS is not precluded from contesting a surrogate court's conclusion about the reasonableness of a fee).
See generally Mitchell M. Gans, Federal Transfer Taxation and the Role of State Law: Does the Mari-
tal Deduction Strike the Proper Balance?, 48 EMORY L.J. 871 (1999).
81. See generally supra note 80. In the interest of fairness to nonprofits, their officers, and direc-
tors, it is possible to modify the rule that there is to be no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect to be
given to state court decisions favorable to a nonprofit party in which the IRS was not a party to a pro-
ceeding. The rule in Bosch and its progeny currently imposes a "one way street" down which the IRS is
not bound by state court decisions favorable to defendants, and yet up which losing parties can be
bound to their disadvantage in further IRS proceedings. The proposed changes that allow the IRS to
share information with State Attorneys General are welcome in many respects, but taken together with
the wider jurisdictional overlap, they elevate the problem of repetitive litigations. A preferable approach
to address unfairness might be to bind the IRS to a state court's prior resolution of identical issues when
the IRS had the opportunity to participate in a proceeding and declined. Such a rule would add predict-
ability to law and promote substantive fairness.
82. I.R.C. § 507(g), for example, provides that a termination tax imposed by the Service can be
abated, at the discretion of the Service, if an appropriate state official certifies that the assets of the
private foundation in question are:
preserved for such charitable or other purposes specified in section 501(c)(3) as may be or-
dered or approved by a court of competent jurisdiction, and upon completion of the corrective
action, the Secretary receives certification from the appropriate State officer that such action
has resulted in such preservation of assets.
I.R.C. § 507 (West 2004). Other provisions for abatement include IRC §§ 6701,4961, and 4962.
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federalism suggest that the IRS should have to defer to the State, or at least
stay its hand until the proceedings conclude, to protect the charity from
inconsistent mandated governance changes."8 3 Federalism principles may
suggest such a result, but thus far they have not compelled such a result.
And even if the problem of duplicate actions is minimized by procedural
rules and the convergence of jurisprudence, concern about protracted du-
plication litigation would persist. Brody explained her concern about the
sheer exhaustion of a defendant's resources in the context of a private-
inurement prosecution:
A charity that violates the private-inurement (and excess-benefits) pro-
scription also violates the duty-of-loyalty requirements of State nonprofit
law. Depending on the resources and inclinations of the State attorney
general's office, the charity might be facing investigations on two fronts.
Under current privacy law applying to exempt organizations, the State
can share information with the IRS, but the IRS cannot share information
about its investigation short of notifying the State of revocation of ex-
emption. However, because this final determination might not be made
for a number of years, a tax-exempt organization may have exhausted its
assets through illicit transactions or disposed of its assets or changed its
operations in a way which can no longer be corrected by the time the IRS
is permitted to inform the State.
84
CONCLUSION
I am left considering whether a supplemental set of proposals would
help to alleviate these concerns. Overlap might be less objectionable if the
two principal agencies had formally assigned principal responsibilities; that
is, if priorities were to some extent established by statute along with en-
forcement authorization.
It is probable that the under-resourced nature of charities enforcement
results, at least in part, from overlap and from the failure to establish such
priorities. For example, knowledge that the Service polices the same juris-
diction, with respect to a jeopardizing investment, as the Attorney General,
may reduce the imperative for enforcement resources by the states. And it
can work the other way. Knowledge that the states will police, for example,
reasonable compensation questions, may affect the Service's decision not
to be the "first responder" to such incidents.
Especially in light of the proposed changes being considered, it is time
to consider more formal assignments of primary enforcement responsibili-
83. See Brody, supra note 33; Brody, supra note 23, at 543-45; I.R.C. § 507 (establishing that the
Service is already empowered to consider the findings of state charities enforcement officials and
judges in certain situations).
84. Brody, supra note 33 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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ties in the nonprofit legal regime-assignments which would reduce the
discretion of the principal agents involved to pursue wrongdoing and in-
crease the predictability of enforcement. Understanding who should assume
these roles would minimize confusion about whether responsibility for
action rests with the state or federal actors. It should not be necessary to
return entirely to the historical divisions of responsibility, nor to be indif-
ferent to the variations among the states in terms of resources and effec-
tiveness of enforcement. Nonetheless, it would be useful to give
organizations advance notice of which agency in the first instance should
take responsibility for an investigation of wrongdoing, and under what
circumstances.

